Source: Identity Assertion JWT Authorization Grant (IETF draft)
IETF OAuth WG draft defining the ID-JAG: an IdP-signed JWT, obtained by token exchange, that a client presents via the JWT bearer grant to another domain's authorization server.
Contents
- What: Internet-Draft draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant (Standards Track, work in progress)
- Authors: Aaron Parecki (Okta), Karl McGuinness, Brian Campbell (Ping Identity)
- Date: revision -06, 2026-10-31; read 2026-11-14
- Original: datatracker
Summary
Defines a two-step cross-domain flow. Step one: a client holding a user’s ID Token or SAML assertion from the enterprise IdP performs RFC 8693 token exchange at that IdP asking for an ID-JAG aimed at a specific resource authorization server. Step two: the client presents the ID-JAG with the RFC 7523 JWT bearer grant to that resource AS and receives an ordinary access token. This is the token format behind MCP Enterprise-Managed Authorization and Okta’s Cross App Access.
Key claims
- Token type URN
urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id-jag; JWTtypheaderoauth-id-jag+jwt; RS256 mandatory to implement. - Exchange request:
requested_token_type= id-jag (required), exactly oneaudience= the resource AS issuer (required),resourcerecommended,scopeandauthorization_detailsoptional;subject_tokenis an ID Token, SAML 2.0 assertion, or optionally a refresh token. Client authentication at the IdP is required. - Required claims:
iss,sub(subject identifier chosen for the target AS),aud,client_id(the client’s ID at the resource AS),jti,exp,iat. Optional:resource,scope,authorization_details,act, tenant claims,email,auth_time,acr,amr. - Resource AS must check
typ, trustediss, signature,audequals its own issuer, andclient_idequals the authenticated client; it must reject requests that have neither client authentication nor a sender-constrained (DPoP) ID-JAG. - Security considerations cover subject-token storage, step-up, metadata validation, subject identifier disclosure, actor delegation and sender-constrained tokens.