Source: MCP Security Best Practices

Official catalogue of MCP-specific attacks (confused deputy, token passthrough, SSRF, handle hijacking, local server compromise, malicious auth URLs, mix-up) and their mitigations.

Contents
  • What: security tutorial complementing the authorization spec
  • Author/publisher: Model Context Protocol project
  • Date: version for revision 2026-07-28; read 2026-11-14
  • Original: Security Best Practices

Summary

A threat catalogue for people implementing MCP auth, operating servers or assessing MCP deployments. Each entry gives the attack and normative mitigations.

Key claims

  • Confused deputy: an MCP proxy using one static client ID with a third-party AS, plus dynamic client registration and consent cookies, lets an attacker obtain codes without consent. Fix: per-client consent stored server-side before forwarding, exact redirect URI matching, single-use state.
  • Token passthrough is forbidden: accepting tokens not issued for the server breaks audit, rate limits and trust boundaries.
  • SSRF: a malicious server can point OAuth metadata URLs at 169.254.169.254 or internal IPs. Clients should require HTTPS, block private ranges (with a vetted library), validate redirects, use egress proxies.
  • State handle hijacking: possession of a handle is not authentication; bind handles to the user ID from the verified token.
  • Local server compromise: one-click install configs can run arbitrary commands; clients MUST show the full command and require consent, and should sandbox servers. Local servers should prefer stdio or restrict HTTP access.
  • Malicious authorization URLs: reject non-http(s) schemes like javascript:; never open URLs via a shell; XSS plus a stdio-spawning proxy can escalate to RCE.
  • Mix-up attacks: mitigated by iss validation; PKCE alone does not stop them.
  • Scope minimization: start with minimal scopes and step up; avoid wildcard scopes and publishing every scope in scopes_supported.

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