Source: Codex agent approvals and security (OpenAI docs)

Codex's two-layer safety model: OS sandbox modes (read-only, workspace-write, danger-full-access) and approval policies, with network off by default.

Contents
  • What: official product documentation
  • Publisher: OpenAI
  • Date: living document, read 2026-11-14 (references Codex versions 0.114/0.115)
  • Original: Agent approvals & security

Summary

Codex separates what commands can technically do (sandbox) from when the agent must stop and ask (approval policy). Defaults: network off, writes confined to the workspace.

Key claims

  • Sandbox modes: read-only; workspace-write (basis of the “Auto” preset); danger-full-access (no sandbox, not recommended).
  • Approval policies: on-request (ask before leaving the sandbox, using the network or running untrusted commands); never (for CI, paired with a sandbox); granular; untrusted is retired. An optional auto-review agent screens approval requests, denying critical-risk actions and failing closed.
  • Network in workspace-write is off unless sandbox_workspace_write.network_access = true; a network proxy enforces allow/deny domain rules (deny wins); local/private destinations blocked by default. Web search defaults to a cached index.
  • OS mechanisms: macOS Seatbelt (sandbox-exec); Linux bubblewrap plus seccomp; Windows MXC (with legacy fallbacks); WSL2 uses the Linux sandbox.
  • Protected paths stay read-only inside writable roots: .git, .agents, .codex, .aws.
  • Cloud tasks run in OpenAI-managed containers: setup phase may use the network to install dependencies; the agent phase is offline by default and secrets are removed before it starts.
  • Inside Docker/dev containers the Linux sandbox may fail; using danger-full-access there shifts isolation to the container.
  • Web results and external content must be treated as untrusted (prompt injection).

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