Source: RFC 8693 OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange
IETF standard (Jan 2020) for trading one security token for another at an STS, with explicit impersonation vs delegation semantics and the act / may_act claims.
Contents
- What: IETF RFC 8693, Standards Track
- Authors: M. Jones, A. Nadalin, B. Campbell (ed.), J. Bradley, C. Mortimore
- Date: January 2020; read 2026-11-14
- Original: rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693
Summary
Adds a grant type, urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange, that turns an authorization server into a Security Token Service. A client sends a subject_token (who the request is for) and optionally an actor_token (who will act) and gets back a new token narrowed to a target service. It is the building block for down-scoping tokens across hops, for ID-JAG issuance, and for vault products that swap a first-party token for a third-party one.
Key claims
- Parameters:
subject_token+subject_token_type(required);actor_token+actor_token_type;resource(URI) andaudience(logical name), both multi-valued;scope;requested_token_type. - Servers may return
invalid_targetwhen the requested targets are too broad; clients should ask for narrow access. - Impersonation: the new token’s holder is indistinguishable from the subject. Delegation: the actor keeps its own identity and the token records both parties.
- The
actclaim names the current actor; nestedactclaims record a chain (current actor outermost). Only the top-level claims and current actor should drive access decisions; earlier actors are informational. may_actdeclares in advance who is allowed to act for the subject.- Security: authenticate clients (otherwise a stolen token can be exchanged by anyone), limit scope and lifetime, send tokens only over TLS, minimise personal data in tokens.