Source: RFC 8693 OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange

IETF standard (Jan 2020) for trading one security token for another at an STS, with explicit impersonation vs delegation semantics and the act / may_act claims.

Contents
  • What: IETF RFC 8693, Standards Track
  • Authors: M. Jones, A. Nadalin, B. Campbell (ed.), J. Bradley, C. Mortimore
  • Date: January 2020; read 2026-11-14
  • Original: rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693

Summary

Adds a grant type, urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange, that turns an authorization server into a Security Token Service. A client sends a subject_token (who the request is for) and optionally an actor_token (who will act) and gets back a new token narrowed to a target service. It is the building block for down-scoping tokens across hops, for ID-JAG issuance, and for vault products that swap a first-party token for a third-party one.

Key claims

  • Parameters: subject_token + subject_token_type (required); actor_token + actor_token_type; resource (URI) and audience (logical name), both multi-valued; scope; requested_token_type.
  • Servers may return invalid_target when the requested targets are too broad; clients should ask for narrow access.
  • Impersonation: the new token’s holder is indistinguishable from the subject. Delegation: the actor keeps its own identity and the token records both parties.
  • The act claim names the current actor; nested act claims record a chain (current actor outermost). Only the top-level claims and current actor should drive access decisions; earlier actors are informational.
  • may_act declares in advance who is allowed to act for the subject.
  • Security: authenticate clients (otherwise a stolen token can be exchanged by anyone), limit scope and lifetime, send tokens only over TLS, minimise personal data in tokens.

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